Chapter 6 Learning from the Kenyan solar PV innovation history by Ockwell, David & Byrne, Rob
6
LEARNING FROM THE KENYAN
SOLAR PV INNOVATION HISTORY
The detailed historical analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 demonstrates the ways
in which the development of the off-grid solar PV market in Kenya resembles
processes of Socio-Technical Innovation System Building. In this penultimate
chapter we focus specifically on the implications of these observations for policy and
practice. We begin by revisiting the dominant policy framings introduced in
Chapter 1, namely Hardware Financing and Private Sector Entrepreneurship. We
then discuss how approaches based on these framings contrast with a Socio-Tech-
nical Innovation System Building approach and how the latter holds more promise
in terms of supporting transformative policy interventions with greater potential to
address the sustainable energy access problematic.
In relation to each framing, we provide an empirical example. We begin by
contrasting the Hardware Financing framing of the Photovoltaic Market Transforma-
tion Initiative (PVMTI) with Lighting Africa’s more Socio-Technical Innovation
System Building-oriented approach. We then introduce a new policy intervention
that was not covered in the innovation history in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, as it is
too new to be able to chart tangible results. This is the example, mentioned in
Chapter 1, of Kenya’s new Climate Innovation Centre (CIC) – an infoDev/World
Bank initiative with support from the UK’s Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID) and its Danish equivalent, Danida. The CICs represent a good example
of a Private Sector Entrepreneurship framing to the problem of sustainable energy
access and technology transfer more broadly. While it is too early to provide any
detailed empirical evidence, we present what evidence is currently available in the
public realm on the Kenyan CIC and discuss the potential implications of the framing
it adopts in terms of its likely impact in transforming sustainable energy access, or
supporting low carbon development more broadly in Kenya or beyond. This ex-ante
analysis of the transformative potential of the CIC approach builds on the insights from
the historical analysis of the solar PV market given in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, and
the Socio-Technical Innovation System Building perspective these insights support.
Then, having presented quite a critical perspective on the two policy approaches
that exemplify the framings we have argued are inadequate (PVMTI and CICs),
we end the chapter by putting forward some recommendations for how policy
might operationalise a Socio-Technical Innovation System Building approach in
order to maximise chances of creating the conditions within which transforma-
tions in sustainable energy access are more likely to occur. This draws on lessons
from the Lighting Africa example as well as generic insights from our detailed
innovation history of solar PV in Kenya. In doing so, we articulate a vision for a
new kind of institution with the potential to better support the development,
transfer and adoption of sustainable energy technologies in developing countries,
especially among lower-income countries where socio-technical innovation
systems are less well developed, but where significant opportunities exist to build
such systems around sustainable, pro-poor technologies across the board (energy-
related or otherwise). We have, elsewhere, introduced this idea in the form of
institutions that we have called ‘Climate Relevant Innovation-system Builders’
(CRIBs) (see Ockwell and Byrne 2015), but we believe it is applicable to other
sustainability issues.
Hardware Financing and Private Sector Entrepreneurship versus
Socio-Technical Innovation System Building
In Chapter 1, we introduced three alternative framings through which the issue of
sustainable energy access – as well as linked concerns such as low carbon technology
transfer and low carbon development or green growth – can be understood. Two of
these, Hardware Financing and Private Sector Entrepreneurship, tend to dominate
current international policy narratives. To recap briefly, these two framings and
their associated narratives can be summarised as follows:
 Hardware Financing: A Hardware Financing framing of the problem of sustainable
energy access is based on a standard Environmental Economics argument. This
argument acknowledges, for example, that low carbon energy technologies are
not competitive with fossil fuel-based energy technologies because their prices
fail to reflect the positive externalities to society of mitigating future greenhouse
gas emissions. This leads to the assumption that introducing market-based
mechanisms, like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which allow
technology hardware suppliers to be paid for these positive externalities (i.e.
subsidised), will provide incentives for investment in low carbon energy tech-
nologies in developing countries. This argument carries the additional assumption
that such investment in low carbon energy hardware will be extensive enough to
reorient technological change and economic development in developing
countries towards more sustainable directions.
 Private Sector Entrepreneurship: A Private Sector Entrepreneurship framing of the
sustainable energy access problem focuses at a more micro-economic level. It
argues, for example, that low carbon technological change will be driven by
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innovation in the private sector and therefore emphasises the need to provide
venture capital to entrepreneurial private sector initiatives in developing
countries. Again, this argument carries a similar assumption to the Hardware
Financing framing, namely that such venture capital provision for sustainable
private sector entrepreneurship will reorient countries’ development trajectories
towards more sustainable directions.
Our central aim in this book has been to demonstrate the limitations of the
above two framings for the problem of sustainable energy access, and to provide an
alternative. In turn, the alternative should be a framing that is equally relevant to
broader issues such as low carbon technology transfer, low carbon development,
green growth, etc. The alternative we have been promoting is what we have called
Socio-Technical Innovation System Building.
 Socio-Technical Innovation System Building: This framing significantly broadens
the focus of potential policy interventions, emphasising the need for a systemic
understanding of how innovation and technological change can be nurtured
through policy. It also emphasises the importance of attending to the social
practices with which sustainable energy (and other) technologies intersect, the
co-evolutionary nature of innovation and socio-technical change and the
existing socio-technical regimes with which sustainable energy technologies
must compete.
One potential criticism of this systemic framing of the problem is that the policy
prescriptions it generates risk being too context-specific to be practical – that they
are not generic enough to be widely-applicable and so are unworkable as policy
interventions. Indeed, the attraction of the other two framings, particularly Hard-
ware Financing and market-based mechanisms in general, is that they can be
explained with simple narratives and that they come with policy prescriptions that
are entirely generic. That is, context-specific issues are irrelevant to the applicability
of such policy interventions.
We would dispute these arguments, and so, in this penultimate chapter, our
concern is two-fold. First, we provide some comparative examples and more
detailed discussion of specific policy interventions that characterise all three of the
framings summarised above. This serves both to re-emphasise the limitations of
interventions based on Hardware Financing or Private Sector Entrepreneurship and
to provide a worked example of Socio-Technical Innovation System Building in
practice. Second, we provide a concrete proposal for how Socio-Technical Innovation
System Building could be achieved using generic policy approaches, while achieving
results that respond to the context specificities that are critical determinants of the
impacts of policy interventions across the richly variegated characteristics of different
countries (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of context specificities in
relation to sustainable energy access).
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Hardware Financing: The Photovoltaic Market Transformation
Initiative (PVMTI)
Let us begin with an example from our innovation history of solar PV in Kenya,
which fits well with a Hardware Financing approach. In 1998, the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) began implementing a project in Kenya that was
intended to transform the market by addressing a perceived finance constraint. The
Photovoltaic Market Transformation Initiative (PVMTI) made USD 5 million
finance available on both the demand and supply sides of the Kenyan PV market,
which would be disbursed in loans to consumers and suppliers over the ten-year
life of the project (Gunning 2003, p. 81). Finance for customers, it was assumed,
would enable them to overcome the high initial cost of PV systems and therefore
release pent-up demand. Finance for companies would allow them to purchase in
bulk and so reduce their costs, hence lowering prices to consumers. In this way,
the initiative clearly adopted the kinds of narratives that characterise the Hardware
Financing framing of how sustainable energy access might be increased in Kenya,
in this case, by financing the purchase of solar PV modules and solar home systems
(SHSs). The project was to be implemented in three countries simultaneously:
Kenya, Morocco and India. Kenya was ‘viewed as a true free market for PV products’
(IFC 1998, p. 12), presumably therefore making it the ideal context for a market-
based intervention (although this clearly begs the question as to why, if the Kenyan
market was truly free, would any market-correcting policy intervention be neces-
sary?). With a total investment across the three countries of USD 25 million, the
project was expected to have a discernible impact on sales in the world market;
specifically, the impact was expected to be about a 5 per cent increase in world PV
sales within five years (IFC 1998, p. 14).
A request for proposals was issued in September 1998 (Gunning 2003, p. 85). As
the terms of lending were a leverage of 1:1 and a minimum PVMTI investment of
USD 0.5 million, companies in Kenya were forced to come together as con-
sortiums because no single company could risk such an amount of money (Bresson
2001, p. 5; Ngigi 2008, interview). One of the first consortiums to submit a pro-
posal involved the Cooperative Bank of Kenya (CBK) together with battery
manufacturer Chloride Exide and EAA. This received ‘first-track’ status, meaning
that it was acceptable in principle and ready for implementation (Ngigi 2008, inter-
view). However, the IFC had issues with investing in CBK because of their non-
performing assets and decided the proposal was not bankable. Soon after this,
according to Ngigi (2008, interview), disparaging articles began appearing in the
local media and EAA became one of PVMTI’s biggest critics. Certainly by 2001,
there was evident disquiet and impatience expressed in the SolarNet1 newsletter by
some actors (de Bakker 2001, pp. 4–5; Bresson 2001, pp. 5–6; Muchiri 2001, p. 4).
Other proposals were received (Hankins and van der Plas 2000; Ngigi 2008,
interview), and a long process of negotiations ensued – negotiations between the
consortiums and the IFC and, when these failed to produce deals, local financial
institutions were persuaded to engage with the project, these deals collapsing after
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more protracted negotiations (Ngigi 2008, interview). Eventually, it appeared that
most of the available finance would finally be disbursed. Three deals were agreed:
one with Barclays Bank Kenya, one with Equity Building Society and one with
Muramati Tea Growers Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) (Hankins and
van der Plas 2000, p. 29). But these fell apart for various reasons, and the disquiet
among stakeholders mentioned above turned to resentment.
Byrne (2011) identifies a range of factors that contributed to the failure to broker
finance deals for SHSs through PVMTI. These include the following:
1. The minimum deal size was too large for the Kenyan market. Minimum
investment was USD 0.5 million from a local consortium, to be matched by
PVMTI. No local suppliers were able to mobilise this level of investment on
their own.
2. There was misalignment between the IFC and local banking rules, making it
impossible for either party to finalise deals.
3. The transaction costs were too high for mainstream banks, despite some
interest in bundling deals for on-lending to micro-finance institutions (MFIs).
The deal flows were too small compared with the costs of managing them.
This failure stimulated some actors to begin discussing ways in which PVMTI
might be changed in order to provide some tangible benefit to the market (van der
Vleuten 2008, interview). These actors approached PVMTI in 2003 requesting
help with capacity-building (Magambo 2006, p. 1). In 2004, PVMTI went through
a restructuring (IFC 2007b, p. 42). As a result of meetings with PV actors in Kenya
and the frustrations felt within the PVMTI hierarchy itself (Ngigi 2008, interview),
together with the evidence for training and quality needs (Jacobson 2002a; Jacobson
2002b) and the availability of some technical assistance2 grant money, PVMTI
began a capacity-building project in Kenya in 2006 (IFC 2007b, p. 42; PVMTI 2009).
A grant of USD 350,000, together with ‘in-kind contributions and co-financing’ of
USD 115,000, was used to support the Kenya Renewable Energy Association
(KEREA), the development of a PV curriculum, PV training courses, the produc-
tion of three manuals (user, vendor and installer manuals) and a quality assurance
programme (Magambo 2006; IFC 2007b, p. 42; Nyaga 2007, interview; PVMTI
2009). PVMTI was then extended to 2011, and local actors began to take a more
favourable view of the project (Ngigi 2008, interview).
These latter activities closely resemble various aspects of the capability-building
activities noted in previous chapters as being critical to building well-functioning
socio-technical innovation systems. Eventually, then, this adjustment of PVMTI’s
approach resulted in what looked like valuable contributions to fostering the systemic
capabilities that provided the bedrock upon which the Kenyan solar PV market
developed. But, in terms of the project’s main goal – to make a discernible impact
on the Kenyan PV market by financing hardware purchases – it was a failure,
having helped to finance only 170 SHSs (IFC 2007b, p. 42) in a country that is
estimated to have had around 200,000 installed SHSs in 2005, rising to an estimated
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320,000 in 2010 (Ondraczek 2013). Similar critiques have been levelled at
PVMTI’s Hardware Financing-based approach in other countries, such as India
(Haum 2012). Hardly a market transformation then.
Socio-Technical Innovation System Building: Lighting Africa
Let us now compare the case of PVMTI to the approach of Lighting Africa, an
approach that we have already argued looks like a policy intervention resembling
Socio-Technical Innovation System Building. Curiously, this initiative, as with
PVMTI, was also funded by the IFC. As already described in Chapter 5, Lighting
Africa was launched in September 2007 with a global call for project proposals
aimed at developing new lighting products and delivery models for Africa’s large,
unelectrified, rural off-grid lighting market. The hope was that recent advances in
performance of key technologies – especially light-emitting diodes (LEDs) – could
be harnessed to provide cheaper and better lighting for the so-called bottom of the
pyramid (BOP). Grants of up to USD 200,000 were available for each successful
proposal, and 16 were selected from the more than 400 proposals received, four of
them to be implemented in Kenya (Lighting Africa 2008c, p. 7). Since then,
Lighting Africa conferences have been held in 2010 (Nairobi) and 2012 (Dakar),
during which awards were given for a selection of ‘outstanding’ lighting products
on the market. The most recent conference took place in Dubai in October 2015,
although it is unclear whether any awards were given this time.
Soon after its launch in 2007, the Lighting Africa programme began imple-
menting a wider range of activities than the call for project proposals. These
activities included market research in several countries, product testing and the
development of quality assurance methodologies, identification of financing needs
throughout the value chain, knowledge-sharing and self-evaluation and moves to
identify policy constraints by researching the policy environments in several coun-
tries (Lighting Africa 2009). For Kenya, by the end of 2008, the programme had
already provided highly detailed qualitative and quantitative market assessments
(Lighting Africa 2008a; Lighting Africa 2008b). And much more research followed,
including on products available in Kenya, product-testing and a review of the
policy environment and policy actors (see the Lighting Africa website3 for these
reports).
Active interventions in Kenya began in 2009 and, over the next few years – up
to the official completion of its pilot phase in mid-2013 – the programme engaged in a
number of other activities. These interventions included an aggressive and roaming
awareness-raising campaign, quality assurance labelling of products, the setting-up of
a product quality testing facility, training of technicians, capacity-building for
business development and for finance institutions, lobbying of policy-makers on
regulations and building networks of actors to encourage the flow of information.
The systemic nature of these capability-building activities undertaken by Lighting
Africa, together with their direct engagement with potential technology users and
attention to the kinds of technologies that might best suit local needs, is much
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closer to a Socio-Technical Innovation System Building approach than to either
Hardware Financing or Private Sector Entrepreneurship interventions. While it is
difficult to determine the extent to which outcomes can be attributed directly to
these efforts, the programme does make a series of claims about its impact across
Africa (see Table 6.1). And a recent updated survey in three towns in Kenya tends to
support the notion that the market for pico-solar off-grid lighting products has
expanded rapidly since 2009. Specifically, the survey report claims that cumulative
sales of quality-assured pico-solar products since 2009 had reached about 2.3 million
in Kenya by June 2015 (Turman-Bryant et al. 2015, p. 6). This suggests that the
Lighting Africa approach has been far more transformative than PVMTI could ever
claim to have been.
PVMTI versus Lighting Africa
The SHS market in Kenya is now worth about USD 6 million annually, and more
than 320,000 SHSs have been installed (Ondraczek 2013). We do not have figures for
the value of the pico-solar market but, as reported above, the number of products sold
is significant. This is still a relatively small fraction of the population with access to
small quantities of electricity from PV. Nevertheless, as argued in Chapter 5, the
case does represent one of the best examples in Africa of anything resembling a
transformation in relation to sustainable energy access.
Little – if any – of the success can be attributed to the Hardware Financing
intervention PVMTI. But the IFC may have learned important lessons from the
PVMTI experience that informed the design of the Lighting Africa programme –
whether or not this is the case is an empirical question in need of further research.
TABLE 6.1 Lighting Africa claimed impacts as of December 2014
Quantity Impact
35,000,000 People across Africa with improved energy access due to modern solar
lighting products
14,380,000 People in Africa whose basic lighting needs are being met by modern solar
lighting products
7,500,000 Quality solar lighting products sold through local distributorships in Africa
700,000 Tons of GHGs avoided in Africa
31 % growth in sales of quality-assured solar lights between July and
December 2014
4.8 % of Africa’s un-electrified now using solar lights up from less than 1%
in 2009
41 Manufacturers whose products have passed the Lighting Global Quality
Standards
25 Countries where quality-verified products are on sale in Africa
Source: Selected impacts reported in Lighting Africa (2014).
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The Lighting Africa programme has taken a more systemic approach to developing
the market, albeit a different segment of the market than the target of PVMTI. It
has focussed more on building capabilities throughout the value chain, building
actor networks and influencing policy and other institutions. These are all supply-
side activities. However, crucially, from the perspective of this book, Lighting
Africa also built a detailed understanding of the electricity needs and desires of poor
people, using this to inform its awareness-raising efforts and, thereby, helping to
create demand for solar lighting alternatives to kerosene.
So, one clear lesson from the evolution of the Kenya PV market is that its success –
whether for SHSs or pico-solar lighting products – is explained by a combination of
interventions that has addressed several dimensions of a nascent socio-technical
innovation system. An interesting aspect of these interventions has been the
attempt to understand the detail of consumer preferences and constraints. This has
enabled much better designs of SHSs and lighting products that address the con-
text-specific nature of electricity services in rural areas. And the results suggest that
governance of inclusive energy transitions would be improved by taking a systemic
approach and that, in this approach, working more closely with consumers of
energy services to understand their needs more deeply would raise the chances of
providing more appropriate solutions.
Private Sector Entrepreneurship: Climate Innovation
Centres (CICs)
Having explored the relative success of Lighting Africa’s Socio-Technical Innovation
System Building approach next to PVMTI’s Hardware Financing approach, we now
spend some time examining a current policy intervention that typifies the Private
Sector Entrepreneurship framing. This is the example of the CICs introduced
briefly in Chapter 1. Although, as the analysis below reveals, the CICs are to some
extent already engaged in activities that could move them beyond their pre-
dominant focus on private sector entrepreneurship, there is significant potential to
do much more. While it is too early to judge the success of the Kenyan CIC and,
furthermore, we lack the empirical evidence to do so (another area warranting
further research), it is possible from publicly available documentation to examine
the way in which the CIC approach is framed. It is also possible to look at the
outcomes reported to date. It is on the basis of such ex-ante analysis, building on
the lessons from the comparison of Lighting Africa and PVMTI above and the
theoretical insights from this book, that we analyse the CIC approach below.
CIC framing and approach
The CICs are being implemented as the ‘flagship initiative’ (infoDev 2015, p. 4) of
infoDev’s (the World Bank’s innovation arm) Climate Technology Programme
(CTP), in collaboration with DFID and Danida (the UK and Danish overseas
development agencies). At the time of writing, CICs have been launched – or have
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business plans and are in the process of being launched – in seven locations: Kenya,
India, Ethiopia, South Africa, Morocco, Vietnam and the Caribbean. The CICs’
focus is very much on financing local entrepreneurship around climate technologies
via ‘a tailored suite of financing and services that support domestic SMEs’ (infoDev
2015, p. 8).
The overall framing and associated narratives with which the CTP operates are
well captured by the following statements taken from the CTP brochure (infoDev
2015, pp. 4, 8):
The CTP supports the private sector in developing countries – targeting SMEs
and entrepreneurs – to innovate novel technologies and business models to
address local climate challenges.
The CICs build local capacity and address barriers to innovation by offering
a tailored suite of financing and services that support domestic SMEs. With the
CIC’s assistance, innovative enterprises become more competitively and profit-
ably involved in booming local and international cleantech markets – creating
jobs and leading to economic growth.
The document goes on to describe how knowledge bridging is also being
attempted across different countries’ CICs, providing a means of sharing and
accessing knowledge internationally, including policy insights.
The quotes above demonstrate how the CTP and CICs frame small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurs as the key actors in addressing
local climate challenges, including energy access, an issue mentioned several times in
the document as something the CICs will positively impact. The CTP website claims
one of its impacts will be to ‘provide energy access to over 28 million people …’,4
and the brochure claims that the programme will provide ‘clean energy to an
additional 35,000 homes in South Africa’ and ‘1,400MW of off-grid renewable
energy access’ (infoDev 2015, p. 5). It should be noted that energy access is just
one planned impact of the programme among a range of others, including:
 tapping into, in unspecified ways, the ‘vast untapped resource’ of women and
girls’ contribution to ‘climate sectors’ (infoDev 2015, p. 7);
 ‘allowing 3,000,000 people including women and girls to be less vulnerable to
the effects of climate change’ (infoDev 2015, p. 5);
 ‘allowing access to clean water for 90,000 Ethiopian households’ (infoDev
2015, p. 5).
This casts the claimed benefits of funding private sector entrepreneurship in
relation to climate technologies very widely, intersecting with multiple other
development priorities, including gender, climate adaptation and resilience, clean
water and sanitation, as well as sustainable energy access. These claims are then
followed with a narrative that depicts supporting these actors with venture financing
as the key to plugging both local innovators and developing countries ‘more
Learning from the Kenyan solar PV history 149
profitably’ into ‘booming local and international cleantech markets’ with resulting
benefits in terms of jobs and economic growth (infoDev 2015).
The implication is that this kind of financial and other business support to pri-
vate sector entrepreneurs is the means through which transformative impacts can be
achieved in sustainable energy access as well as a raft of other climate-related areas.
Bearing in mind the much broader suite of both actors and activities that previous
chapters have demonstrated are necessary for well-functioning socio-technical
innovation systems, we might readily conclude that this kind of Private Sector
Entrepreneurship approach is likely to meet with limited success. It certainly does
not look like the kind of systemic intervention that we have so far argued is
necessary to transform sustainable energy access. When we look at the list of
activities that the CICs are meant to conduct, however, it becomes clear that the
CICs’ activities are, in fact, intended to be broader than a single focus on financing
private sector entrepreneurs.
The Kenyan CIC from a Socio-Technical Innovation System perspective
Each of the national-level CICs is launched with its own business plan developed
from a consultative process that engages with a range of private, NGO and public
sector stakeholders. The Kenyan CIC’s business plan (summarised on its website)
states the following mission, intended impact and goals:5
Our Mission
Our Mission is to provide an integrated set of financing, venture acceleration
services, market development and networking activities that builds the quality
and quantity of Kenyan entrepreneurs and startups delivering innovative climate
and clean energy solutions to local and international markets.
Impact
The CIC is here to deliver a mix of economic, environmental and social results,
including job creation, reduction of carbon dioxide emission, greater climate
resiliency, and access to clean energy, safe drinking water, better sanitation and
strengthened technology transfer and local innovation capacity.
Our Goals
 Providing flexible financing mechanisms that support entrepreneurs
and new ventures at varying levels of innovation and scale.
 Building innovation capacity through the delivery of advice, assistance
and training products.
 Enabling collaboration and developing policies that support an
innovation ecosystem in East Africa.
 Identifying and unlocking new opportunities through access to
information and market intelligence.
150 Learning from the Kenyan solar PV history
 Providing access to facilities that support business development through
co-working and networking space and technical development for rapid
design, adaptation, proto-typing, testing and manufacturing.
While the mission is firmly focussed on Kenyan entrepreneurs and start-ups, the
goals of the CIC make for interesting reading in the context of this book. The
second goal speaks of ‘building innovation capacity’, the third of supporting ‘an
innovation ecosystem in East Africa’, and the fourth mentions ‘access to information
and market intelligence’. Both ‘building innovation capacity’ and supporting ‘an
innovation ecosystem’ are clearly linked to aspects of the Innovation Studies theory
introduced in Chapter 2, and facilitating ‘access to market intelligence’ was one of the
key contributions of donors highlighted in our analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
Clearly, then, at least at the level of the Kenyan CIC’s aims and ambitions, a more
systemic approach to transforming sustainable energy access, or markets for other
climate-relevant technologies in Kenya, is an idea with which the CIC is sympathetic.
When we look at the various ‘global activities’ that the CTP brochure (infoDev
2015) sets out, which are designed to support entrepreneurs and SMEs and to net-
work CICs across the different constituent countries where they are being rolled out,
we see additional activities that resemble more systemic interventions. These activities
(detailed in the brochure and summarised on the CTP website) include:6
 CIC Design and Implementation: CIC LAUNCH will lead scoping, design,
resource mobilisation and implementation activities to meet client country
demand for CICs.
 Global Financing: The IGNITE Fund will mobilise and syndicate global
funding for high-impact climate technologies and offer deal-flow to
public and private investors eager to support promising climate ventures in
developing countries.
 Evidence-based Analysis: Climate TRACK will actively package lessons from
individual CICs and provide cutting-edge analytical products and policy
toolkits on supporting private sector innovators in developing countries.
 Connecting Markets: Market CONNECT will provide software, web-enabled
services and networking technology to build interconnectivity between
CICs and link promising companies with global partners and expertise.
 Measurement Tools: Impact Xchange will provide each CIC with a web-based
Impact Monitoring System (IMS) to track results and impacts in real-time.
The ideas of lesson-sharing and learning in relation to Climate TRACK and the
networking activities under Market CONNECT are certainly, on the face of it,
activities that intersect with some of the key elements of the Socio-Technical
Innovation System Building highlighted in previous chapters.
As emphasised above, without more in-depth empirical research, it is impossible
to get an accurate picture of the extent to which actual activities on the ground are
delivering against these stated aims, which pertain to pursuing more systemic
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interventions. From the perspective of the public information available on the
Kenyan CIC website, the actual activities being pursued look, on the face of it, to
fall well short of the stated aims above regarding building what they call innovation
ecosystems. Activities are grouped around four categories:7
1. Business Acceleration: Kenya CIC provides diverse services to support entrepreneurs
in cleantech to grow their ideas.
2. Financing: CIC aims at facilitating flexible access to finance to fund clean
technology businesses through their growth cycle.
3. Market Development: The CIC provide market intelligence products including
the market opportunity for various clean technologies.
4. Matchmaking: The KCIC provides a one-stop matchmaking service that offers
a range of quality services.
The market development activity sounds like it might deliver something of
interest in the context of the activities described in previous chapters regarding
donors investing and making publicly available market research. Drilling down under
the market development activity, the website claims that the CICs will provide:8
 Market Information: The KCIC provides market intelligence products including
the market opportunity for various clean technologies, current market penetra-
tion, and information on ideal price points for large-scale consumer adoption. We
also provide information on competing solutions in the market.
 Sector Trends: The KCIC provides technical information on a regular basis to
enable technology development in line with market needs. The CIC is
developing a database that will provide entrepreneurs with information on
cleanTech component sourcing as well as providing consumers with clean
technology options to meets their needs.
 Technical Information: The KCIC provides a database of financial support from
various sources available in Kenya to provide entrepreneurs and consumers
with information on financing options. The CIC also provides access to the
latest information, market research and trends for various technologies,
enabling technology to be developed in-line with market needs.
But there is nothing on the website that resembles this kind of information. The
only relevant material in the document repository is a report and policy brief on
the regulatory environment for solar energy in Kenya. Perhaps the intention is that
this kind of market development information will be provided on a bespoke basis to
individual CIC ‘clients’ (as the website refers to the entrepreneurs and the SMEs
the CIC supports). But such private provision of information is not in line with
the publicly available market research funded by donors during the development of the
solar PV market. It would therefore be unlikely to underpin any transformative
change, benefiting, as it would, only the individual private ‘clients’ in receipt of
such CIC-funded research.
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The website showcases an impressive range of example clients across the three
sectors on which the Kenyan CIC focusses (renewable energy, water management
and agri-business). Drilling down into the details of the services that each client is
receiving, however, it seems that the main focus is on providing support for
accessing finance, developing business plans and other (often unspecified) business
development support. Interestingly, several of the renewable energy-related
examples include provision of support to test and improve technology hardware,
presumably by funding access to R&D and testing facilities through one of the
Kenyan CIC partner organisations. None of the activities that seem to currently be
underway in the Kenyan CIC, therefore, seem to be focussed on anything much
beyond assisting with accessing finance or other mainstream business incubation
activities, together with some support for technology hardware development.
Notwithstanding the caveat of further empirical research being required to trian-
gulate the analysis presented here, it does seem as though the CIC’s current activities
are squarely located within a two-dimensional technology-finance approach. This
mirrors the dominant two-dimensional focus of the literature on energy access in
Sub-Saharan Africa that we critiqued in Chapter 1. The predominant emphasis on
financing SMEs and entrepreneurs also positions the CICs as typical of a Private
Sector Entrepreneurship framing of potential solutions to sustainable energy access.
It would not be unreasonable, therefore, bearing in mind the alternative perspec-
tive proposed in this book, to question the extent to which the CICs are likely to
deliver the kinds of transformative long-term impacts that their brochure claims
they will.
However, we do not wish to argue that the CTP and constituent CICs are
negative initiatives. Funding or financing entrepreneurs to engage in innovative
activities that engage with any of the climate-relevant sectors the CICs support must
have potential social, economic and environmental benefits. As we were at pains to
emphasise in the Introduction to this book, our argument is certainly not that
hardware financing or private sector entrepreneurship are unimportant. They aren’t.
Furthermore, it seems clear both from the evidence available in the public realm,
and the authors’ conversations with stakeholders in Kenya, that the CICs are
having a positive impact in terms of convening diverse stakeholders around the issue
of climate technology and innovation. This, at least, is providing a new platform on
which these stakeholders can engage with one another, develop new networks, or
cement existing ones. These are all critical to the development of well-functioning
socio-technical innovation systems.
But the question remains, no matter how successful the SMEs and entrepreneurs
supported by the CICs become: is this enough to transform sustainable energy
access or, for that matter, the CICs’ other focal sectors? To what extent will the
new technologies and business models supported by the CICs lead to wider
impacts across Kenya? Will they remain isolated examples of SME success stories,
or will they connect with other stakeholders, building momentum and improving
technological capabilities across the country, enhancing its innovation system? It
seems quite an ambitious assumption to think that the creation of a number of new
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companies – the brochure lists a target of 2,500 new companies across all seven
countries where CICs are being established – will be enough to transform energy
access, or technology availability and adoption in other climate-relevant sectors. In
what way does the CIC approach encourage innovation that engages with the
social practices of technology users? To what extent will they be able to compete
with existing energy interests (or the interests of mainstream, non-sustainable agri-
cultural and water management actors) and influence dominant socio-technical
regimes? Is the expectation that this will all happen of its own accord, or is some-
thing more deliberate and proactive required to connect the dots and lift the CICs
beyond their core focus on financing private sector entrepreneurship and business
incubation?
These are all empirical questions. Some are perhaps answerable now with proper
empirical research efforts, some perhaps answerable in time, once we reach a point
where we are able to look back at the history of the CICs and what they were able
to achieve. But it would be a shame, particularly in light of the historical evidence
analysed in this book, not to at least attempt some level of a priori analysis and
recommendations for policy and practice that might catalyse transformative change.
Of course, Socio-Technical Innovation System Building could be integrated as
part of the CICs’ activities under an extended remit. This may be something that
infoDev, DFID, Danida, and national governments and local partners in the CICs
might wish to consider in future. CICs are, after all, likely to represent important
networks of climate technology-relevant individuals and organisations across the
public, private and NGO sectors, and provide excellent potential routes for iden-
tifying and engaging with key actors. Indeed, as discussed below, innovation system
building was an explicit intention of the originators of the idea that eventually
became the CICs (Sagar et al. 2009).
Practical approaches to Socio-Technical Innovation System Building
Having conducted a somewhat critical analysis of PVMTI and the CICs, it would
be remiss of us not to conclude the analysis in this chapter with some concrete
suggestions of how policy could be designed in ways that operationalise a Socio-
Technical Innovation System Building approach. In the final section of this chapter,
we therefore describe an approach that builds on Ockwell and Byrne (2015),
which elaborates proposals that responded to a new interest within the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in achieving
technology transfer by means of strengthened national innovation systems. While
the paper dealt specifically with the context of the UNFCCC, here we describe
how this policy approach is equally relevant to efforts to transform access to sus-
tainable energy in developing countries. We begin by outlining the key policy
goals that are implied by the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3, and the empirical analysis given in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. We then
proceed to outline two linked policy proposals through which these policy goals
might be achieved.
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Overarching policy goals
The overall goal of policy must be to build functioning socio-technical innovation
systems that augment the transfer, development and diffusion of sustainable energy
technologies and related practices in developing countries, enhancing technological
capabilities through a range of targeted interventions. These must be inclusive in
their approach – attending to the self-defined needs of those countries and different
groups within – if sustainable energy technology adoption is to be widespread and
underpin pro-poor sustainable development pathways. Material presented in this
book provides some clues as to what such an inclusive approach might be. The
various interventions described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 – where they have
achieved some measure of success – were designed and implemented on the basis
of careful and context-specific understandings of the needs in the market and of
users. Notable in this regard is Lighting Africa, which conducted highly detailed
studies of the lighting practices and needs of poorer users in Kenya (and elsewhere).
This suggests that further gains might be achieved by including users more actively
in the design of promising solutions to their needs, rather than merely observing
these needs and eliciting users’ feedback on products already on the market. The
overall desired result is to provide protective spaces in which sustainable energy
technologies and practices can be fostered, thus promoting their adoption, adaptation
and further innovation.
In order to achieve this, we suggest the following overarching policy goals
should orient interventions. However, it is important to note that interventions to build
socio-technical innovation systems are deeply interdependent. They are therefore best
implemented together in systemic fashion rather than separately. We conclude this
subsection with a list that articulates a range of specific policy interventions that
could be pursued in order to fulfil each goal. In subsequent sections, we go into
detail on how interventions through policy and practice could deliver such
interventions.
Goal 1: Build networks of diverse stakeholders
Efforts are required to link diverse arrays of stakeholders, from technology importers
and suppliers through to policy-makers and technology users. Such networks enable
the flow of knowledge among stakeholders, each of whom can bring different
resources, experiences and perspectives to bear on problem-framing and problem-
solving activities. They can also become a fundamental element of socio-technical
innovation systems by establishing the linkage component of capabilities. But these
linkages must be strong and meaningful. In order to achieve this, stakeholders need
to work proactively together in projects, programmes and other interventions. In
doing so, they are more likely to build mutual trust and understanding, as well as
identify strengths and weaknesses in local technological capabilities. Simultaneously,
by pursuing such activities, new technological capabilities can be built, including
the development of relevant knowledge and skills.
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Goal 2: Foster and share learning
Learning is critical to the development of technological capabilities and functioning
innovation systems, and the resulting successful markets for climate technologies that
these can support. A key role for policy lies in commissioning research – whether
market research, academic analysis, monitoring and evaluation, baseline studies,
R&D and so on – and making sure the results are publicly available. Because
contexts evolve in unpredictable ways, incremental innovation supported by reflexive
analysis offers a practical strategy to shape sustainable development pathways. Research
at all levels from local to international, and from different perspectives, can provide
crucial information to help realise such reflexive change. The public availability of
such information can play a fundamental role in reducing perceived risks among
both potential investors and technology users, as well as enhance the transparency
of policy processes. This facilitates clear and evolving understandings of things such
as user needs and preferences, appropriate hardware components relative perfor-
mance of different technology brands approaches that have met with success factors
that contributed to difficulties or failures and how to overcome these training and
education needs and so on. The learning and experience that result can feed into
future projects and programmes, whether publicly or privately funded.
Goal 3: Promote the development of shared visions
Linked to the need to build meaningful networks and foster learning, there is the
need to create shared visions of what pro-poor sustainable energy access – and
sustainable development more broadly – look like in particular contexts, and what
roles different sustainable energy technologies play in those contexts. This is not
simply a top-down effort in which sustainable energy technology solutions are
chosen and then stakeholders are persuaded of their merit through dissemination
and awareness-raising activities. As everyone is affected by both sustainable devel-
opment issues and efforts to address them, consensus-building around sustainable
development, including sustainable energy access, is critical. Learning from research
and experience provides an essential component for constructive debate and is itself
enhanced by the flow of knowledge through diverse stakeholder networks. By
fostering understandings of what sustainable energy technologies can and cannot
provide, how they work and the ways others have benefited from them, visions
can develop around informed understandings of different technological options. It
also affords opportunities for users to provide feedback on both their self-defined
needs and their experiences (good and bad) with different technologies. As a result,
shared visions develop among technology users, suppliers and other stakeholders
relating to how and in what way sustainable energy technologies can underpin
different development pathways. This simultaneously provides vital user feedback
into both technology design and the configurations and brands that vendors and
suppliers provide, with attendant implications for potential market size and
profitability.
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Goal 4: Support diverse experimentation
Again linked to learning, funding is needed to provide protected spaces for experi-
mentation with promising sustainable energy technologies, practices and policies.
Stakeholders throughout the supply chain need to gain experience of technologies
and learn what works and what does not within specific contexts (across different
countries, regions, villages, technologies, social practices, political contexts, etc.).
Experimentation can target a range of different aspects. It might, for example,
include supporting new multi-stakeholder projects that test and develop ideas.
These could relate to new technical configurations, new hardware, new practices
around existing technologies, new consumption and production practices that
could improve the benefits accrued by users and so on. Experiments might also
focus on mutually supportive interventions that link different stakeholders across
markets, thereby building supply chains and fostering new market opportunities
where potential market players lack awareness of each other or potential market
opportunities they might target. Interventions could also experiment with working
‘upwards’ through value chains, building on existing markets to develop progres-
sively higher-value segments, adding value to existing sectors and fostering
increasing economic returns from sustainable energy technology initiatives across
developing countries.
Specific policies and interventions for delivering against these
overarching goals
Below is a (non-exhaustive) list of specific policies and interventions that could
deliver against these overarching goals and contribute to Socio-Technical Innova-
tion System Building.
Goal 1: Network building
 Link diverse stakeholders nationally.
 Link diverse stakeholders internationally.
 Link diverse stakeholders locally.
 Link diverse stakeholders across markets.
 Link diverse stakeholders across sectors (private, public, NGOs, research, etc.).
 Link supply-side actors (e.g. supply chain, policy, NGOs, etc.) with technology
users.
 Link national government with technical experts.
 Link national firms with international firms.
Goal 2: Learning
 Commission market research.
 Commission research into technology user needs and preferences.
Learning from the Kenyan solar PV history 157
 Commission research into technology performance.
 Commission research into education and training needs.
 Monitor and evaluate projects and programmes.
 Conduct baseline studies.
 Conduct comparative research across local, national, international scales that
addresses the various research foci above.
 Make results of research and monitoring and evaluation publicly available.
 Create spaces for stakeholders to reflect on research and experiences.
 Provide training for firms.
 Provide training for suppliers and installers.
 Provide training for technology users, villages, households.
 Advise on and develop technology certification schemes.
 Advise on education and training needs (up to and including postgraduate
training).
Goal 3: Foster shared visions
 Convene consensus-building events with different national stakeholder groups.
 Convene scenario-building events to discuss alternative development pathways
that different sustainable energy technologies might contribute to or constrain.
 Facilitate opportunities for different stakeholders to feed back into the technology
design and configuration process.
Goal 4: Provide protected spaces for experimentation
 Encourage and incentivise treatment of ‘failures’ as valuable points for learning.
 Commission projects as experiments (examples of potential foci for
experimentation are provided below).
 Experiment with technological hardware.
 Experiment with policies.
 Experiment with social practices in relation to sustainable energy technologies.
 Experiment with new stakeholder configurations.
 Experiment with production processes.
 Experiment with linking stakeholders across markets to create new market
opportunities and market awareness.
 Experiment with value-adding experiments, working upwards through supply
chains.
Existing international policy mechanisms
While working towards the overarching goals above, it is essential that policies
designed to nurture socio-technical innovation systems are implemented in a way
that recognises and builds on existing relevant policy mechanisms and institutions.
Designing effective policy also requires an understanding of what these existing
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initiatives are doing that is of relevance to nurturing socio-technical innovation
systems and where there are gaps that need to be filled. Here we review two core
areas of relevant policy efforts: (1) the UNFCCC’s Climate Technology Centre
and Network (CTCN); and (2) four parallel climate technology centre and
network initiatives currently being funded by the Global Environment Facility
(GEF). We then provide a visual overview of the coverage of these existing
programmes, together with the CICs, against the overarching policy goals
articulated above.
It should be noted that a range of other institutions (e.g. the International
Renewable Energy Agency, IRENA), policies, mechanisms (e.g. the Clean
Development Mechanism, CDM) and centre-based models (e.g. Innovación Chile
and CGIAR, the Collaborative Group for International Agricultural Research) also
exist and deserve consideration when implementing the recommendations in this
chapter. It is, however, beyond the scope and space available here to provide a full
review of all relevant initiatives. We have therefore opted instead to focus on the
most relevant emerging initiatives.
The Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)
In the context of actions under the Convention (the UNFCCC), one of the most
relevant institutions is the Climate Technology Centre and Network9 (CTCN),
the operational arm of the UNFCCC’s Technology Mechanism under the strategic
guidance of its own Technology Executive Committee (TEC). As its name suggests,
the CTCN is structured around a core climate technology centre that coordinates a
broader network. The Centre is hosted and managed by the UN Environment
Programme (UNEP) in collaboration with the UN Industrial Development
Organisation (UNIDO) and support from 11 centres of excellence located in
developing and industrialised countries.
The CTCN’sNetwork refers to a range of technical experts and centres of excellence
who have expertise that might be matched against requests for technical assistance
from countries. Requests from countries come from national designated entities
(NDEs). NDEs10 (usually government ministries or agencies) are granted responsi-
bility by Parties to the Convention to manage national technology-related requests
to the CTCN. These requests are coordinated by the Centre, which responds itself
to some, while others are farmed out to relevant experts in the Network. This
NDE-instigated approach attempts to facilitate a process that is demand-driven by
Parties. There are three core services offered by the CTCN (see CTCN 2014 for a
detailed description of these services):
1. Provide technical assistance to developing countries to enhance transfer of
climate technologies.
2. Provide and share information and knowledge on climate technologies.
3. Foster collaboration and networking of various stakeholders on climate
technologies.
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The first core service follows requests from NDEs, while the other two services
can be initiated by the CTCN or other stakeholders as and when common needs
are identified.
From the perspective of building socio-technical innovation systems, there are
several key points to note with regard to the CTCN:
1. The Network is not an in-country network of actors of relevance to different
(existing or emerging) climate technologies as prescribed in the list of
overarching goals above.
2. There is nothing, in theory, stopping Parties requesting, via NDEs, support
from the CTCN in advising on and instigating the kind of Socio-Technical
Innovation System Building policies detailed in our list above.
3. NDEs are usually government institutions – not locally nested, climate
technology-specific institutions.
4. At present, the CTCN’s activities do not explicitly recognize the need to
nurture socio-technical innovation systems as a key part of the technology
transfer, development and diffusion process – although elements of innovation
system building are implicit within two of the CTCN’s core services: those
that focus on information and knowledge sharing, and fostering collaboration
and networking between stakeholders.
5. The recognition of knowledge-sharing, networking and the emphasis on
capacity-building elaborated in the operating manual for NDEs suggests sig-
nificant potential for the CTCN to coordinate its attempts to achieve a
stronger focus on Socio-Technical Innovation System Building. However,
this would require more explicit attention to, and understanding of, Socio-
Technical innovation System Building, and processes for strengthening them
to be integrated into the CTCN’s approach
6. The TEC has recently initiated a work stream focusing on National Systems
of Innovation as a means for strengthening efforts under the UNFCCC to
develop and transfer climate technologies. This suggests considerable potential
to engage productively with efforts under the CTCN and UNFCCC more
broadly around implementing the policy proposals outlined further below.
Global Environment Facility-funded initiatives
The other key initiatives of note here are those being implemented by the GEF
under its Long-Term Program on Technology Transfer. These include:11
1. The project ‘Pilot Asia-Pacific Climate Technology Network and Finance
Center’, which is being implemented with the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) and UNEP.
2. The project ‘Finance and Technology Transfer Centre for Climate Change’
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
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3. The project ‘Pilot African Climate Technology Finance Center and Network’
by the African Development Bank (AfDB) (which includes regional partners
that are part of the CTCN consortium).
4. The regional project ‘Climate Technology Transfer Mechanisms and Net-
works in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)’ by the Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB), which is currently in preparation, again with
regional partners that are part of the CTCN consortium.
As with the CICs, the emphasis of the second of these various initiatives (the
EBRD one) is mostly focussed on finance. However, the other three all have elements
that pertain to a more networked, capacity-building focus and hence have
potential to act as socio-technical innovation system builders. For example, the
ADB-led Asia-Pacific initiative (number 1 above) includes aims12 of facilitating a
network of national and regional technology centres, organisations and initiatives;
building and strengthening national and regional climate technology centres and
centres of excellence; designing, developing and implementing country-driven
climate technology transfer policies, programmes, demonstration projects and scale-
up strategies. These activities are pursued in parallel to another part of the initiative,
that focusses explicitly on finance.
While detailed information is difficult to obtain on number 3 (the AfDB-led
African initiative), it seems that, as well as a core finance component, more net-
work and capacity-building activities will be included, with publicity materials
released by AfDB suggesting that ‘enhancing networking and knowledge dis-
semination’ is seen as the key way the project will ‘scale-up deployment of [climate
technologies]’.13 The final one (number 4, IABD) is not yet operational. However,
it is very much focussed on network and capacity-building. As well as providing
finance, it seeks to ‘strengthen existing activities on [environmentally sound tech-
nologies] in LAC and aim at the consolidation of long-term collaborative initiatives
that are aligned with the objectives and modalities of the Technology Mechanism
under UNFCCC’.14 Planning, assessments and networks are very much at the
foreground of the activities proposed under this initiative.
As with the CTCN, however, the extent to which these GEF-funded initiatives
support the development of socio-technical innovation systems depends on the
extent to which an explicit focus on innovation system building can be main-
streamed across the various activities. The language used is certainly open to a
systemic perspective, but achieving real impacts will depend on more deliberate
integration of Socio-Technical Innovation System Building activities across the
board.
Gaps analysis of existing policy
In order to get an overview of the extent to which the initiatives reviewed above
are delivering the kind of policy interventions that would be likely to achieve
Socio-Technical Innovation System Building, delivering against the overarching































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































goals articulated above, Table 6.2 provides a graphical overview of the current and
potential coverage of each initiative. Table 6.2 also provides a useful overview of
the aggregate pattern of coverage across the initiatives. Each initiative is assessed,
based on available public documentation, on the extent to which it: (1) explicitly
includes activities akin to the policy options under each goal within its existing
remit and structure (the Ys for ‘yes’); (2) has potential to deliver against a policy
option within (or with incremental adjustments to) its existing remit and institutional
structure (the Ps for ‘possible’); and (3) requires significant revisions to remit and
institutional structure in order to deliver against a goal (the Ns for ‘no’). The initial
row also indicates whether Socio-Technical Innovation System Building is an
explicit goal of each initiative.
Several key observations can be made from Table 6.2:
1. Most initiatives have potential within, or via incremental adjustments to, their
existing remit and structure to extend their activities to include Socio-Technical
Innovation System Building activities.
2. At present, however, there is limited focus on activities that would nurture
socio-technical innovation systems in developing countries.
3. The most coverage exists in the area of network building. However, even this
coverage is patchy, with most initiatives focussing on high-level national or,
more commonly, international networking activities, or linking national
entities with international technical experts. Many of the essential networking
activities that are necessary to build socio-technical innovation systems in
ways that will result in sustained pro-poor socio-technical change are generally
not addressed (e.g. linking with technology users or fostering local networks
along supply chains).
4. Learning receives a small amount of patchy coverage across the initiatives.
5. Fostering shared visions and providing protective spaces for experimentation
are not covered at all at present.
Two linked policy proposals
Our Socio-Technical Innovation System Building approach can be implemented using
two distinct but linked proposals, as summarised here and described inmore detail below:
1. Creation of Sustainable Energy Access Relevant Innovation-system Builders15 (SEA-
RIBs). This involves the creation of specific institutions (preferably based in
existing organisations) in different countries that are focussed on building
socio-technical innovation systems around sustainable energy technologies
(SEA-RIBs). These institutions would then work to coordinate efforts to
implement Proposal 2 below, as well as engaging in broader functions
(described in more detail below). This approach could be pursued as an
initiative under SE4All. It could also be integrated with an extension of the
UNFCCC architecture (specifically with the CTCN) and/or link with various
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centre-based initiatives under the GEF (see Ockwell and Byrne 2015 for
more detail on the nature of such integration). It is also feasible for it to be
pursued bi- or unilaterally through donor, individual government or NGO-
driven activities. As emphasised below, however, such centres would be likely
to have greater impact if networked across different countries and regions
(e.g. via the CTCN).
2. Using projects and programmes to build socio-technical innovation systems. This pro-
posal focusses on the possibilities of designing project- and programme-based
investments in sustainable energy access to maximise impacts on building
socio-technical innovation systems. It can be pursued by any actors engaged
in work on sustainable energy access. Again, it is likely to have far greater
impact if actors pursuing such approaches coordinate via new or existing
networks.
Proposal 1 could be adopted in a way that is integrated with Proposal 2, working
to ensure that as many project-based interventions as possible are pursued in ways
that maximise opportunities for Socio-Technical Innovation System Building.
Proposal 2, on the other hand, could be pursued in isolation from Proposal 1. For
actors involved in attempts to improve sustainable energy access, it could represent
a strategic commitment to maximising the impact of their activities on Socio-
Technical Innovation System Building. Clearly, however, the transformative
impact of activities pertaining to Proposal 2 is likely to be far higher if pursued as
part of nationally and internationally coordinated efforts via the kinds of institutions
suggested in Proposal 1. We describe each proposal in more depth below.
Proposal 1: Creation of Sustainable Energy Access Relevant
Innovation-system Builders (SEA-RIBs)
As the analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 has demonstrated, the socio-technical
innovation system that emerged around the Kenyan PV market was, in important
ways, developed via the targeted, long-term efforts of specific actors, or ‘champions’,
acting as socio-technical innovation system builders. This proposal is therefore
intended to create institutions that are able to take on such a system-building role.
There are examples of similar roles having been taken on in the past, such as the
CGIAR, Innovación Chile and the UK’s Carbon Trust – all of which represent
nationally situated, long-term institutional presences that pursue approaches that are
sensitive to the needs and contexts of the people and organisations with whom
they engage. The proposal here is to learn from the successes of such nationally
focussed, strategic initiatives and bolster them with insights from the kind of
in-depth historical research on what has worked for sustainable energy access in the
past, such as the empirical evidence presented in this book.
SEA-RIBs would play a strategic facilitating role within countries, acting as the
convening point for a national network of actors across the spectrum of those
involved in relevant or potential socio-technical innovation systems (from users,
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through supply chains, to NGOs and policy-makers) and championing the devel-
opment of socio-technical innovation systems around different technologies. Their
core remit would be to link together national actors around a strategic, long-term,
nationally defined vision that is cognisant of national policy goals and local realities.
They would develop detailed knowledge of national capabilities and key areas where
opportunities exist for rapid development and growth, and they would identify areas
where international expertise and knowledge sharing are required. SEA-RIBs
would provide strategic oversight, advising on how to target sustainable energy
access (or broader climate technology) programmes and projects in a coordinated
way that responds to identified priority areas for both rapid growth and long-term
capability-building. As implementers of Proposal 2 below, such institutions would
also work to ensure that all projects and programmes are used strategically to build
and strengthen socio-technical innovation systems.
Careful attention will be needed from the outset to ensure that activities conform
to the funding criteria of potential funders (e.g. donors, the development banks,
GEF, the Green Climate Fund). This may require specific tailoring and packaging
of different initiatives accordingly. The key added value of such funding being
channelled through, or at least engaging with, SEA-RIBs is the opportunity to
increase coordination and ensure every dollar spent leverages further benefits in
building relevant aspects of national socio-technical innovation systems via a grounded
understanding of the context-specific needs of individual countries and technologies.
This would provide the most powerful and effective means of mainstreaming
Socio-Technical Innovation System Building activities in individual countries, with
myriad benefits in terms of driving transformations in sustainable energy access.
It is likely that SEA-RIBs would meet with the most success if they were situated
in existing organisations in respective countries, preferably organisations with some
level of existing knowledge of sustainable energy access and development. Such
organisations would need a broad policy-level perspective on these issues as opposed
to specialising, for example, in technology hardware and R&D, or finance. It should
be evident from the analysis in this book that what is required is a perspective that
goes well beyond the traditional narrow focus on technology and finance.
As outlined above, as with Proposal 2, it is easy to imagine the adoption of SEA-
RIBs under international initiatives around sustainable energy access. If it were
considered of value to connect with efforts around climate technologies under
the UNFCCC, this could be achieved by framing sustainable energy access within
the broader agenda around climate technology transfer and development. This
could then entail using CRIBs (the climate-technology specific version of this
proposal, described in Ockwell and Byrne 2015) as a means to strengthen the
capabilities of the NDEs that currently are the only national level presence that the
CTCN has. NDEs usually represent a small percentage of a civil servant’s time –
nothing like the level of dedicated institutional presence and resources required to
engage in meaningful Socio-Technical Innovation System Building. The intro-
duction of CRIBs could work well within the UNFCCC, as they could be Party-
led, responding directly to requests for support from specific countries and
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delivered via a simple extension of the existing architecture of the UNFCCC’s
Technology Mechanism.
It is important to note that the concept of a centre-based approach to Socio-
Technical Innovation System Building has synergies with, but differs in important
ways from, existing centre-based ideas, both in the literature and in practice. A
centre-based approach formed the central thrust of at least two proposals at the
time of the critical UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009, in the form of
a policy brief by Ockwell et al. (2009) and, most notably and more substantively, a
paper by Sagar et al. (2009). Both called for the establishment of ‘climate innovation
centres’ in developing countries, citing the successes of initiatives such as the
CGIAR and the UK Carbon Trust (Sagar et al. 2009) and institutions such as
Innovación Chile (see Ockwell et al. 2010b). Significantly, Sagar et al.’s paper led to
infoDev’s commissioning further analysis by Sagar (see Sagar and Bloomberg New
Energy Finance 2010), which led to the establishment of infoDev’s CICs. Impor-
tantly, however, the CIC approach differs in practice from the approach suggested
by Sagar et al. (2009), which had as its central tenet the use of CICs to build
national innovation systems.
Sagar et al.’s (2009, p. 280) proposal was for ‘a network of regional “Climate
Innovation Centres”’ that would focus explicitly on building ‘innovation ecosystems’
around specific low carbon energy technologies (note: they referred to innovation
ecosystems while citing the literature on national systems of innovation). This
included a range of capacity-building activities – activities that go well beyond
what eventually became the infoDev-led CICs. The CICs also differ from Sagar et al.’s
proposal in that they are nationally situated, not regional. But, as discussed above,
their activities are far more limited and focus very much on financing the activities
of entrepreneurial SMEs, ignoring the activities of the multitude of other relevant
actors who make up national innovation systems, or the kinds of activities that
nurture them.
As emphasised in Ockwell and Byrne (2015), there are important differences
between the CRIBs and SEA-RIBs proposed here and either Sagar et al.’s (2009)
proposal or any of the existing international policy initiatives around sustainable
energy or climate technologies. First, both CRIBs and SEA-RIBs are intended to
operate at the national and sub-national level and reach out from here to the
regional or international level. This responds to the emphasis in the literature
reviewed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 on national and sub-national level inter-
ventions. For example, the actors identified in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 who
played a Socio-Technical Innovation System Building role in Kenya’s solar PV
sector were nationally situated actors, most having been present in the country and
focussed on work on solar PV for decades. A similar knowledge of national circum-
stances and capacities has been observed in China’s strategic use of the CDM to
strengthen its own national innovation system (Watson et al. 2015). Indeed, it is
difficult to find innovation system level analyses that focus at any level above the
national level. Most examples cited in the literature on climate change and innovation
are national-level interventions – the UK’s Carbon Trust, Chile’s Innovación
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Chile. Only the CGIAR represents a regional-level initiative, although arguably
much of its success was achieved by targeted interventions during sustained periods
of national presence.
Second, CRIBs or SEA-RIBs are intended to focus on the broader socio-technical
innovation systems as described in this book. This goes beyond the scope of Sagar
et al.’s (2009) definition of an ‘innovation ecosystem’ or the conventional definitions
of national innovation systems within the Innovation Studies literature. Rather, it
focuses on the extended understanding developed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3,
which uses insights on innovation system building from the Innovation Studies
literature and brings these to bear in the context of Socio-Technical Transitions
theory. The latter attends, in particular, to the social practices of technology users and
the existing socio-technical regimes, both of which shape the enabling and com-
petitive environments within which sustainable technologies must survive and,
hopefully, thrive.
Proposal 2: Using projects and programmes to build
socio-technical innovation systems
Ideally, Proposal 2 would be pursued in tandem with Proposal 1 as part of the
strategy of SEA-RIBs in boosting Socio-Technical Innovation System Building
across countries. Proposal 2, can, however, viably pursued independently. Actors
engaged in any sustainable energy access-related activities could adopt the approach
described here as a means to ensure the maximum impact of their individual
projects and programmes. The more they coordinate such efforts with other actors,
the greater the likely impacts.
Proposal 2 essentially involves mainstreaming Socio-Technical Innovation
System Building across all sustainable energy access projects and programmes,
ensuring every opportunity is taken to use projects and programmes to achieve
broader Socio-Technical Innovation System Building impacts. This requires main-
streaming a focus on building innovation systems across all projects and pro-
grammes and designing and implementing them as real-world experiments in
which to better foster learning, and capability and system building. The specifics of
how projects and programmes can be used as opportunities for Socio-Technical
Innovation System Building, in line with the overarching policy goals articulated
above, are outlined in more detail below.
From the evidence and analysis presented in this book, it is clear that there is a
role for donors (and other funders, including inter-governmental organisations and
NGOs) in such projects to provide adequate protection against the full force of
market selection pressures. It is under these conditions that stakeholders can
experiment to generate the learning needed for the sustained development, transfer
and diffusion of sustainability-related technologies and practices, and to nurture the
development of socio-technical innovation systems. But there are other aspects to
the design of projects and programmes that appear to be important. First, we
should be clear about what a project or programme is meant to achieve. Is it the
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demonstration of a ready-made solution for others to imitate, or is it experi-
mentation to contribute to understanding of what solutions could work? Second,
the motivation of project participants needs to be considered, as does, third, the
scope of projects. And, finally, the way in which projects relate to each other
can have powerful impacts, which also generates implications for the role of
institutions at national and international levels. Each of the aspects related to pro-
jects, donors and other public funding bodies, as well as national and international
institutions, is elaborated below. Included in these elaborations are non-exhaustive
suggestions of how each aspect of projects might relate to the four goals recom-
mended above, underlining the importance of the interrelatedness of the goals as
we emphasised before: (1) build networks of diverse stakeholders; (2) foster and
share learning; (3) promote the development of shared visions; and (4) support
diverse experimentation.
Projects as experiments
Projects and programmes should be seen and used as experiments that are
implemented in order primarily to learn, rather than aiming solely to achieve or
demonstrate particular solutions. In other words, they could be recast as experi-
ments to make this learning function clearer, in a similar sense to the way R&D
activities are often characterised. As such, the measures of success of a project
(or programme, experiment) need to be considered carefully. Quantitative indi-
cators can be useful but they can become the sole focus of evaluation. A range of
qualitative ‘indicators’ could help to identify more subtle but important impacts,
such as the kinds of knowledge created from experimentation or the nature of
relationships fostered in network-building. This could also help to reduce the
tendency to assess projects and programmes in ‘failure’ versus ‘success’ terms,
thereby encouraging the sharing of outcomes. In essence, this is about the need
to redefine success as the generation of important lessons, rather than ready-made
solutions.
In terms of the four goals recommended above, this aspect of projects most
clearly relates to supporting diverse experimentation (goal 4). But the purpose of
experimentation, as has been argued, is to create opportunities for learning, and so
there is a direct link to the goal of fostering and sharing learning (goal 2). That is,
the experiments themselves are the spaces in which learning is fostered. However,
learning is only useful to broader innovation system building if it is shared. These
lessons will, of course, be immediately available to project participants who, by
working together, will form a network (at least for the duration of the project) and
thereby contribute to network-building (goal 1). But, for wider and longer-term
network and innovation system building, lessons need to be shared publicly. This
will not only help to build networks of diverse stakeholders (by providing lessons
of potential interest to actors external to projects themselves), but it can also pro-
mote the development of shared visions by grounding possible visions in real-word
experience (goal 3).
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Motivation of project participants
In order for projects and programmes to generate useful learning, the participants
must be motivated to solve real problems. That is, the problems the project or
experiment explores need to be relevant to those involved and so should
be defined by them. The motivation will be further enhanced if the participants
have material interests in the outcomes – if the learning will have value for them.
There is a clear link here with the issue of risk. While mitigating risk is important,
particularly for private sector actors, the elimination of risk could be de-motivating.
So participants should be expected to invest some material resources in experi-
ments, partly to demonstrate to others their commitment but also to ensure that
they have a stake in the outcomes.
This aspect of projects highlights the need for them to be attractive to potential
participants and so, considering the goal of building diverse stakeholder networks
(goal 1), reinforces the point above that problems should be defined by potential
participants. Moreover, this self-definition of problems will raise the chances that
projects will be both relevant to diverse stakeholders and create opportunities for
learning from a diversity of individual perspectives and particular contexts. Clearly,
there are links to fostering and sharing learning (goal 2). But responding to participant
motivations for project involvement is also more likely to mean deeper commit-
ment to projects and attempts to develop shared visions (goal 3). And, if attempts
to attract a wide variety of participants are successful, then there will be more
opportunities to conduct a diversity of experiments, thereby linking with goal 4.
The scope of projects
It is clear that learning is facilitated by deep interactions among a broad range of
actors who can bring their problem-solving efforts to bear on the many dimensions
of development pathways as they unfold in different contexts. This suggests that
there needs to be experimentation on many of these dimensions simultaneously
(and links with our notion of systemic intervention). However, it would be
extremely difficult for a small number of actors to achieve this. To overcome this
difficulty, either complex projects involving a wide range of stakeholders could be
implemented or many simpler projects could be implemented programmatically,
each one operating on a selection of the dimensions of a development pathway.
Each approach will have its advantages and disadvantages. The point is to generate
learning across the multiple dimensions of a pathway so that sustainability-related
technologies and practices can emerge in a co-evolutionary process. The assump-
tion here is that co-evolutionary learning will tend to produce mutually reinforcing
technologies and practices that operate in sympathy with their context, thereby
increasing the chances of widespread adoption of those technologies and practices – and
their sustainability.
Another important point here relates to continuity of efforts. Here, programmes
may have the potential to deliver innovation system building in ways that
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individual projects may not. Funders often want to see results within a few years.
Although funders should monitor progress and stop activities when they are clearly
not functioning, really making headway on an innovation system might take much
longer than a project period – although the potential contribution of individual
projects should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, unless within a programmatic
context with a timespan of, say, ten to fifteen years, or within the context of a
more coordinated national approach to commissioning projects (as would be
achieved via the creation of the SEA-RIBs advocated in Proposal 1 above), projects
run the risk of being one-off efforts with limited structural contributions. A related
point is a trusting relationship between different actors. In societies where contracts
do not play a huge role but relations make the difference, having the same person
run the same programme (or SEA-RIB) for longer can be a key success factor.
In terms of the recommended goals, projects (or programmes) with a wide
scope – as indicated by the range of development dimensions along which a project
or programme is operating – are more likely to result in a diversity of learning
opportunities and lessons generated. Most clearly, this links with the goal of fostering
and sharing learning (goal 2). And, of course, this links clearly with the recom-
mendation to support diverse experimentation (goal 4). But projects with wide
scope are also likely to need to engage with a wide range of actors, and so they
increase the opportunities to build networks of diverse stakeholders (goal 1). If
there is support for projects and programmes over the longer term – as per the
point above about continuity of efforts – then there is also more chance that such
networks will develop strong relationships (also contributing to goal 1). The combi-
nation of learning from diverse experimentation and the continuity of network
building should also help actors to develop shared – and grounded – visions (goal 3).
Interactions with other projects
Following on from the previous recommendation, even complex projects or pro-
grammes of projects could be constrained in their learning, particularly if the
funding is from a narrow range of sources. Moreover, if they are under the same
management, they will be dependent on the particular abilities of that management.
As the case study explored in this book demonstrates, projects or programmes
implemented from different perspectives, if encouraged to interact meaningfully
over the long term, can generate learning that helps to achieve significant results.
This requires some degree of coordination, of course, but not necessarily management.
That is, the individual projects and programmes need to be able to communicate
directly with each other as well as via a central actor. It is here that value could
be added by making SEA-RIBs internationally networked, e.g. through the
UNFCCC’s Climate Technology Centre and Network (especially in the CRIBs
version of our proposal).
Encouraging interaction across projects clearly links with the recommendation to
foster and share learning (goal 2) but there are also links to the other goals. Inter-
actions will help to further build networks of diverse stakeholders (goal 1) by
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creating opportunities for various stakeholders to meet and share their knowledge.
But interactions of this kind can also create spaces in which stakeholders discuss,
debate and develop shared visions (goal 3). And awareness and understanding of
other projects mean the possibility to ensure that any new projects or programmes
do not replicate unnecessarily experiments already conducted, thereby contributing
to the goal of supporting diverse experimentation (goal 4).
Role of donors and other public funding
Many private sector actors, particularly small players in developing countries,
cannot risk much of their capital to undertake experiments. However, there might
be significant benefits if they were able to do this, for them and for wider society.
Therefore, a substantial share of the risk inherent in experimentation could be
borne by donors, who can justify their support in terms of these potential social
benefits. Other sources of public funding, including the Green Climate Fund and
the regional development banks, could serve a similar purpose – although it is
important to ensure that funding sources are also accessible to smaller actors who
might not have the capacities to engage with large, multilateral funding streams
(suggesting a role for donors and NGOs in bridging or plugging this gap). The
involvement of public funding also has the additional significant benefit of making
learning from projects publicly available, thus contributing to wider learning and
long-term capability building.
Another aspect of the risk issue is the stability and long-term provision of sup-
port, as noted above in regard to the continuity of efforts. If the support is unstable,
intermittent or short term, then it is more likely to increase risk than mitigate it.
This is not to argue that support should be unconditional. There needs to be a way
to maintain motivation in individual projects but the thematic, or overarching,
support can be maintained so that there is confidence among stakeholders that it is
worth their investing effort in particular experiments.
Linking with the recommended goals, we can see that the risk-bearing nature of
public funding will more likely foster learning (goal 2) because of the space it
creates in which to experiment (goal 4). And public funding means a greater like-
lihood to share learning because of the demand to make available publicly-funded
research (goal 2). But the public availability of lessons can also help in building
wider networks of stakeholders (goal 1). And wider availability of learning can help
in public discussions and debates about shared development visions (goal 3).
Role of institutions
In order to achieve all of the above in a way that maximises the potential impacts
in terms of Socio-Technical Innovation System Building, appropriate institutional
structures are necessary. It is this that drives the rationale for the creation of SEA-
RIBs under Proposal 1 above. In the absence of such central, nationally-based
institutions, organisations seeking to operationalise Proposal 2 would need to look
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at ways of mainstreaming such Socio-Technical Innovation System Building
through their own approaches to developing, supporting, monitoring and evaluating
projects and programmes.
Finally, with regard to the recommended policy goals above, institutions of the kind
discussed can provide formal channels and mechanisms for coordination and linking.
So, institutions can link to other institutions in formal arrangements, whether they are
sub-national, national or international. This directly helps to achieve network building
(goal 1). It also helps to coordinate the sharing of lessons from projects (goal 2) and,
indeed, can be useful for the coordination of projects and programmes themselves,
such that there is a continuing diversity of experimentation (goal 4). And, in exploiting
formal links and stakeholder networks, institutions can organise more structured
forums in which to develop shared visions (goal 3).
Conclusion
Building on the theoretical developments in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, and the
empirical analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, this chapter has demonstrated a
number of things in relation to policy and practice. First, clear limitations are evident
in the extent to which Hardware Financing interventions, such as PVMTI, and
Private Sector Entrepreneurship interventions, such as the CICs, have achieved or,
in the case of the CICs, are likely to achieve transformative impacts, in the future.
Second, there is clear potential for interventions such as the CICs, as well as the
other international policy initiatives described above, to broaden their aims and
activities in order to more effectively engage in interventions that are likely to have
wider impacts through contributions to Socio-Technical Innovation System
Building. Finally, and critically, the analysis above has articulated a number of key
goals for policy interventions aimed at building socio-technical innovation systems,
together with an elaboration of more specific interventions that would support the
achievement of such goals. As is clear from the discussion above, there is no reason
why such interventions need be limited to a focus on sustainable energy technologies –
they could (if desired) be levelled more broadly at climate technologies or other
technologies of relevance to different aspects of sustainable development.
While we stand by the policy proposals articulated above as positive ways forward
in relation to sustainable energy access and broader attempts to achieve low carbon
or climate-compatible development and ‘green growth’, it is important to flag at
this point some critical caveats. As is dealt with more centrally in Chapter 7, proposals
such as the two detailed above raise important issues relating to the governance of the
kinds of transformations in access to sustainable energy technologies that initiatives
such as SE4All and discourses around ideas like green growth imply. Implicit in
both of the policy proposals above is some sense of organisations or individuals
who have the agency, closely related to financial and political resource availability,
to drive the establishment of the kinds of institutions that we advocate (whether
CRIBs, SEA-RIBs or some other version). This also applies to any actor who
would change their practices in order to implement activities around Proposal 2,
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implementing strategic changes to their projects and programmes to maximise
potential for Socio-Technical Innovation System Building. We might usefully refer
to such actors as Socio-Technical Innovation System Builders. It was clear from the
empirical analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 that key actors did indeed play a
central role in driving the development of the Kenyan solar PV market, building
socio-technical capabilities around solar PV, lobbying government and donors,
connecting different actors. But, when thinking about applying this idea to other
technologies, practices, services, and so on, who should these actors be? How can
we ensure that when Socio-Technical Innovation System Building is pursued, it
does not play out in ways that serve the interests of powerful elites as opposed to
the poor people who, it is assumed, will benefit from sustainable energy access?
Who gains? Who loses? Beyond the pro-poor focus at a national scale, how will
these dynamics play out globally? How can we be sure a similar story as was
observed with the CDM is not observed with sustainable energy access, with
benefits flowing to emerging economies like China and India as opposed to low-
income countries like Kenya? Will the kinds of nationally situated, potentially
more engaged and participatory institutions that we envisage in our proposals
really emerge in practice? If they do, can they overcome the entrenched political
economies within and across nations to truly deliver pro-poor transformations in
technology development, transfer and access? These issues concerning the politics
of any transformation in sustainable energy access, and the questions of govern-
ance raised by the analysis in this book and the policy proposals above, are
revisited in Chapter 7.
Notes
1 SolarNet was a network for renewable energy promotion in the region and published a
widely read newsletter a few times per year. It was formally closed down in 2010
(Kilonzo 2013, interview).
2 Ten per cent of PVMTI money was already available for grants for exactly the kinds of
activities the stakeholders wanted funded (IFC 1998). It is unclear why it took so long
for the money to be made available in-country. But additional grant money was made
available after the grant component was increased to 20 per cent (IFC 2007b; Ngigi
2008, interview).
3 A wide range of materials is available on the Lighting Africa website: www.lightingafrica.org/
4 See www.infodev.org/articles/climate-technology-read-more-about
5 Taken from www.kenyacic.org/?q=node/59
6 Taken from www.infodev.org/articles/climate-technology-read-more-about
7 Taken from www.kenyacic.org
8 Taken from www.kenyacic.org/?q=node/17
9 See www.unep.org/climatechange/ctcn/Home/tabid/131937/Default.aspx
10 For a full list, see http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/render_cms_page?s=TEM_ndes
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14 See www.iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title,1303.html?id=RG-T2384
15 These proposals are drawn from Ockwell and Byrne (2015) in which they refer to
Climate-Relevant Innovation system Builders (CRIBs). Here, we have adapted the
acronym to reflect the fact that our primary focus in this book is on sustainable energy
access.
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